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Abstract Background: Security bugs need to be handled by small groups of engi-
neers before being widely discussed (otherwise the general public becomes vulnera-
ble to hackers that exploit those bugs). But learning how to separate the security bugs
from other bugs is challenging since they may occur very rarely. Data mining that can
find such scarce targets required extensive tuning effort.
Goal: The goal of this research is to aid practitioners as they struggle to tune
methods that try to distinguish security-related bug reports in a product’s bug database,
through the use of a dual hyperparameter optimizer that learns good settings for both
learners and for data pre-processing methods.
Method: The proposed method, named SWIFT, combines learner hyperparame-
ter optimization and pre-processor hyperparameter optimization. SWIFT uses a tech-
nique called -dominance, the main idea of which is to ignore operations that do not
significantly improve the performance. As a result, the optimization effort can be
efficiently reduced.
Result: When compared to recent state-of-the-art results (from FARSEC which is
published in TSE’18), we find that SWIFT’s dual optimization of both pre-processor
and learner is more useful than optimizing each of them individually. For example, in
a 10-way cross-validation study looking for security bugs from the Chromium web-
browser, the FARSEC and SWIFT recalls were 20.4% and 77.1%, respectively, with
false alarm rates under 20%. For another example, in experiments with data from
the Ambari software project, recalls improved from 30.4 to 83.9% while false alarms
remained under 22%.
Conclusion: Overall, our approach shows advantages in achieving better perfor-
mance in a fast way than existing stat-of-the-art method. Therefore, this encourages
us in solving similar problems with dual optimization in the future work.
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1 Introduction
Security bug detection is a pressing current concern. Daily, news reports reveal in-
creasingly sophisticated security breaches. As seen in those reports, a single vulnera-
bility can have devastating effects. For example, a data breach of Equifax caused the
personal information of as many as 143 million Americans – or nearly half the coun-
try – to be compromised [2]. The WannaCry ransomware attack [1] crippled British
medical emergency rooms, delaying medical procedures for many patients.
Developers capture and document software bugs and issues in bug reports which
are submitted to bug tracking systems. For example, the Mozilla bug database main-
tains more than 670,000 bug reports with 135 new bug reports added each day [13].
Submitted bug reports are explicitly labeled as a security bug report (SBR) or non-
security bug report (NSBR). Peters et al. [53] warn that it is important to correctly
identify security bug reports and distinguish them from other non-security bugs re-
ports. They note that software vendors ask that bug reporters should be reported di-
rectly and privately to their own engineers. These engineers then assess the bug re-
ports and, when necessary, offer a security patch. The security bug, and its associated
patch, can then be documented and disclosed via public bug tracking systems. This
approach maximizes the probability that a patch is widely available before hackers
exploit a vulnerability. Sometimes, bug reporters lack the security knowledge [20] to
know when their bug is a normal bug (which can be safely disclosed) or when that
bug is a security matter (that needs to be handled more discretely). Hence, lamentably,
security bug are often publicly disclosed before they can be patched [66].
To address this problem of proper identification of security bugs, researchers have
adopted various techniques [20, 22, 67, 68]. These approaches mainly identified rel-
evant keywords in bug reports as well as features such as word frequency, which
were then used in learning classification models. But learning such models is a chal-
lenging problem. Such bugs may be a very rare occurrence in the data. For example,
data sets from [53] show among the 45,940 bug reports, only 0.8% are security bug
reports. Various methods exist for mining such rarefied data– but those methods re-
quire extensive tuning efforts before they work well on a particular data set. Peters et
al. proposed FARSEC [53], a text mining method that used irrelevancy pruning (i.e.,
filtering). In their approach, developers first identified security related words. Next,
they pruned away the irrelevant bug reports (where “irrelevant” meant “does not have
these security-related keywords”). FARSEC was evaluated using bug reports from
Chromium and four Apaches projects.
The conjecture of this paper is that text mining-based bug report classification ap-
proach (e.g., FARSEC) can be further enhanced. For example, FARSEC applied its
data miners using their default “off-the-shelf” configurations. Software engineering
research results show that hyperparameter optimization (to automatically learn the
“magic” control parameters of an algorithm) can outperform “off-the-shelf” configu-
rations [3, 4, 19, 28, 44, 58, 62]. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
attempt to apply hyperparameter optimization to the problem of distinguishing secu-
rity bug reports. To that end, we distinguish and apply three kinds of hyperparameter
optimization:
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1. Learner hyperparameter optimization to adjust the parameters of the data miner;
e.g. how many trees to use in random forest, or what values to use in the kernel
of a Support Vector Machine (SVM).
2. Pre-processor hyperparameter optimization to adjust any adjustments to the train-
ing data, prior to learning; e.g. to learn how to control outlier removal or, how to
handle the class imbalance problem.
3. Dual hyperparameter optimization that combines 1 and 2.
Standard practice in the search-based SE literature is just to explore just learner or
pre-processor options [3, 4, 7, 19, 59], but not both. This paper shows that for dis-
tinguishing security bug reports, dual optimization performs much better than just
optimizing learner and pre-processor options in isolation.
To make that demonstration, we apply dual hyperparameter optimization to the
options of Table 1. We make no claim that this is the entire set of possible optimiza-
tions. Rather, we just say that (a) any reader of the recent SE data mining literature
might have seen many of these; (b) that reader might be tempted to try tuning the
Table 1 options; (c) when the the methods of this method automatically tuned these
options, we found that our models were dramatically better than the prior state of the
art [53].
This study is structured around the following research questions:
RQ1. Can hyperparameter optimization technique distinguish which bug are ac-
tually security problems?
We find that, hyperparameter optimization technique help better distinguish secu-
rity bug reports from non-security bugs reports, i.e., improving bug reports classifica-
tion performance. Further, the best results for recall/pd come at the cost of a relatively
modest increase in the false alarm rate.
RQ2. Is it better to dual optimize the learners or the data pre-processors in security
bug report classification?
The results show that dual optimizing both data mining learners and data pre-
processors work better than each individual treatment with regards to recall, as well
as as with a high rank in the IFA (Initial False Alarms) metric. In addition, the SWIFT
algorithm used here is much faster (and scales better to more complex problems) that
other methods.
RQ3. What are the relative merits of FARSEC’s irrelevancy pruning (e.g., filter-
ing) vs SWIFT’s hyperparameter optimization in security bug report classifica-
tion?
Without hyperparameter optimization, FARSEC’s irrelevancy pruning does in-
deed improve the performance of vulnerability classification. However, with SWIFT’s
hyperparameter optimization, there is no added benefits to FARSEC’s irrelevancy fil-
tering technique.
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Table 1 List of pre-processors and learners explored in this study. Standard practice in the literature is to
optimize none or just one of these two groups [3, 4, 7, 19, 59]. Note that a dual optimizer simultaneously
explores both pre-processing and learner options.
Type Name Description
Normalizer Normalize samples individually to unit norm.
StandardScalar
Standardize features by removing the mean and
scaling to unit variance.
MinMaxScaler
Transforms features by scaling each feature to
a given range.
MaxAbsScaler Scale each feature by its maximum absolute value.
RobustScalar
Scale features using statistics that are robust to
outliers.
KernelCenterer Center a kernel matrix.
QuantileTransformer Transform features using quantiles information.
PowerTransformer
Apply a power transform featurewise to make data
more Gaussian-like.
Binarizer
Binarize data (set feature values to 0 or 1) according
to a threshold.
PolynominalFeatures Generate polynomial and interaction features.
Pre-processor
SMOTE Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique.
Random Forest (RF)
Generate conclusions using multiple entropy-based
decision trees.
K Nearest Neighbors (KNN)
Classify a new instance by finding “K” examples of
similar instances.
Naive Bayes (NB)
Classify a new instance by (a) collecting mean and
standard deviations of attributes in old instances of
different classes; (b) returning the class whose
attributes are statistically most similar to the new
instance.
Logistic Regression (LR)
Map the output of a regression into 0 ≤ n ≤ 1;
thus enabling using regression for classification.Learner
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP)
A deep artificial neural network which is composed of
more than one perceptron.
Note: The listed pre-processors and learners are based on scikit-learn 0.21.2.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are:
– A new high-water mark result. Specifically, for the purpose of distinguishing se-
curity bugs from non-security bugs, our methods are better than those reported in
the FARSEC paper from TSE’18.
– A comment on the value of tuning (a) data pre-processor or (b) data mining al-
gorithms. Specifically, for the purposes of identifying rare events, we show that
dual tuning of (a) and (b) does much better than tuning either, separately.
– A demonstration of the practicality of dual tuning. As shown below, the overall
runtimes for SWIFT are not impractically slow. This is an important result since
our pre-experimental concern was that the cross-product of the option space be-
tween the (a) data pre-processors and (b) data mining algorithms would be so
large as to preclude dual optimization.
– A reproduction package that other researchers can use to reproduce/improve our
results. While this is more a system contribution than a research result, such re-
production packages are a significant contribution since they enable the faster
replication and improvement of prior results.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce research back-
ground in Section 2, then present related works in Section 3. We describe the details
of our approach in Section 4. In Section 5, we present our experiment details, in-
cluding hyperparameter tuning ranges, data sets, evaluation metrics, etc. We answer
proposed research questions in section 6. We discuss the threats to validity in Sec-
tion 7 and conclude in Section 8.
2 Background
2.1 On the Need for More Secure Software
As noted by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Current
systems perform increasingly vital tasks and are widely known to possess vulnera-
bilities” [11]. Here, by a “vulnerability”, they mean a weakness in the computational
logic (e.g., code) found in software and some hardware components (e.g., firmware)
that, when exploited, results in a negative impact on confidentiality, integrity, or avail-
ability [47].
In their report to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, “Dra-
matically Reducing Software Vulnerabilities” [11], NIST officials urge the research
community to explore more technical approaches to reducing security vulnerabili-
ties. The need to reduce vulnerabilities is also emphasized in the 2016 US Federal
Cybersecurity Research and Development Strategic Plan [54].
Experience shows that predicting for security vulnerabilities is difficult (see §3.1).
Accordingly, this paper explores text-mining related techniques on bug reports, aug-
mented by hyperparameter optimization and oversampling methods.
2.2 Hyperparameter Optimization
In machine learning, model parameters are the properties of training data that will
learn on its own during training by the classifiers, e.g., split point in CART (Classifi-
cation And Regression Trees). Model hyperparameters are values in machine learn-
ing models that can require different constraints, weights or learning rates to gen-
erate different data patterns, e.g., the number of neighbors in K Nearest Neighbors
(KNN) [35].
Hyperparameter are important because they directly control the behaviors of the
training algorithms and impact the performance of the models being trained. Choos-
ing appropriate hyperparameters plays a critical role in the performance of machine
learning models. Hyperparameter optimization is the process of searching the most
optimal hyperparameters in machine learning learners [10]. There are several com-
mon types of hyperparameter optimization algorithms, including grid search, random
search, and Bayesian optimization.
Grid search [9] [58] is a “brute force” hyperparameter optimizer that wraps a
learner in a for-loops that walk through a wide range of all a learner’s control pa-
rameters. Simple to implement, it suffers from the “curse of dimensionality”. That is,
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after just a handful of options, grid search can miss important optimizations. Worse
still, much CPU can be wasted during grid search since experience has shown that
only a few ranges within a few tuning parameters really matter [8].
Random search [8] stochastically samples the search space and evaluates sets
from a specified probability distribution. Evolutionary algorithms are a variant of
random search that runs in “generations” where each new generation is seeded from
the best examples selected from the last generation [21]. Simulated annealing is a
special form of evolutionary algorithms where the population size is one [37] [46].
The drawback of using random search algorithm is that it does not use information
from prior experiment to select the next set and also it is very difficult to predict the
next set of experiments.
Bayesian optimization [52] works by assuming the unknown function was sam-
pled from a Gaussian Process and maintains a posterior distribution for this function
as observation is made. Bayesian optimizers reflect on their distributions to propose
the most informative guess about where to sample next. Such optimizers might be
best-suited for optimization over continuous domains with a small number of dimen-
sions.
All the above algorithms have proven useful in their home domains. But for
software engineering, certain algorithms such as differential evolution (DE) [55] are
known to run very quickly and deliver useful results [3, 4]. Also, The differential evo-
lution has been proven useful in prior software engineering optimization studies [19].
Further, other evolutionary algorithms (e.g., genetic algorithms [21], simulated an-
nealing [37]) mutate each attribute in isolation. When two attributes are correlated,
those algorithms can mutate variables inappropriately in different directions. The dif-
ferential evolution algorithm, on the other hand, mutates attributes in tandem along
with known data trends. Hence, the differential evolution algorithm’s tandem search
can outperform other optimizers such as (a) particle swarm optimization [63]; (b) the
grid search used by Tantithamthavorn et al. [58] to tune their defect predictors; or
(c) the genetic algorithm used by Panichella et al. [49] to optimize a text miner.
The premise of the differential evolution algorithm is that the best way to mu-
tate the existing tunnings is to extrapolate between current solutions. Three solutions
a, b, c are selected at random. For each tuning parameter k, at some probability cr,
we replace the old tuning xk with yk. For booleans yk = ¬xk and for numerics,
yk = ak + f × (bk − ck) where f is a parameter controlling differential weight. The
differential evolution algorithm loops g times over the population of size np, replac-
ing old items with new candidates (if new candidate is better). This means that, as
the loop progresses, the population is full of increasingly more valuable solutions
(which, in turn, helps extrapolation). As to the control parameters of the differential
evolution algorithm, using advice from a differential evolution algorithm user group
(see http://bit.ly/2MdDba6), we set {np, f , cr} = {10n, 0.8, 0.9}, where n
are the number of parameters to optimize. Note that we set the number of iteration
{g} to 3, 10, which are denoted as DE3 and DE10 respectively. A small number (i.e.,
3) is used to test the effects of a very CPU-light effort estimator. A larger number
(i.e., 10) is selected to check if anything is lost by restricting the inference to small
iterations.
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2.3 Data Balancing
Many data sets exhibit highly imbalanced class frequencies (e.g., fake reviews in
Amazon, fraudulent credit card charges, security bug reports). In these cases, only a
small fraction of observations are actually positive because of the scarce occurrence
of those events. In the field of data mining, such a phenomenon makes classifica-
tion models difficult to detect rare events [57]. Both misclassification and failing to
identify rare events may result in poor performance by predictors.
One technique to tackle the imbalanced class issue is based on the sampling ap-
proach [26]. There are three common ways to resample imbalanced data sets [12, 43,
59, 64, 65]:
Fig. 1 An illustration on how the SMOTE technique works.
– Oversampling to make more of the minority class;
– Undersampling to remove majority class items;
– Some hybrid of the first two.
Machine learning researchers [26] advise that undersampling can work better than
oversampling if there are hundreds of minority observations in the datasets. When
there are only a few dozen minority instances, oversampling approaches are superior
to undersampling. In the case of large size of training samples, the hybrid methods
would be a better choice.
The Synthetic Minority Oversampling TEchnique, also known as SMOTE [12],
is a hybrid algorithm that performs both over- and under-sampling. In oversampling,
SMOTE calculates the k nearest neighbors for each minority class samples. Depend-
ing on the amount of oversampling required, one or more of the k-nearest neighbors
are picked to create the synthetic samples. This amount is usually denoted by over-
sampling percentage (e.g., 50% by default). The next step is to randomly create a
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Algorithm 1 Pseudocode of SMOTE. From [3].
1def SMOTE(k=2, m=50%, r=2): # default configurations
2while Majority > m:
3delete any majority sample
4while Minority < m:
5add synthetic samples
6
7def synthetic samples(X0):
8relevant = []
9k1 = 0
10while(k1++ < 20) and size(relevant) < k:
11some = k1 nearest neighbors of X0 #. ’near’ calculated via minkowski distance
12relevant += item in some of X0 class
13Z = any of relevant
14Y = interpolate(X0, Z)
15return Y
16
17def minkowski distance(a, b, r):
18return (Σiabs(ai − bi)r)1/r
synthetic sample along the line connecting two minority samples. This can be illus-
trated in Figure 1 where the blue dots represent the minority class sample, and the
red dots represent the synthetic samples. In undersampling, SMOTE just removes
majority samples randomly.
Algorithm 1 shows the SMOTE algorithm and Table 2 shows the “magic” pa-
rameters that control SMOTE. The best settings for these magic parameters are often
domain-specific. SMOTUNED [3] is a tuned version of SMOTE that uses the differ-
ential evolution algorithm to learn good settings for the Table 2 parameters. SMO-
TUNED will serve as our optimizer for data pre-processing to handle data imbalance
for security bug classification.
Note that data mining algorithms should be assessed on the kinds of data they
might see in the future. That is, data miners should be tested on data that has naturally
occurring class distributions. Hence, while applying SMOTE (or SMOTUNED) to
the training data is good practice, it is a bad practice to apply SMOTE to the testing
data.
2.4 Other pre-processing techniques
Pre-processing techniques are often involved in practical machine learning pipelines.
Beside oversampling technique like SMOTE as we mentioned before, there are many
other available pre-processors. Table 1 lists the pre-processors that we explore in
this study and Table 2 shows the exact ranges which we explore. They are chosen
based on the characteristics of the datasets, for example, we do not select those pre-
processing techniques that are not applicable to our study, e.g., handle missing values,
converting categorical features to a numerical representation or dividing a continuous
feature into a pre-specified number of categories.
Usually, different algorithms make different assumptions about the data, and they
may require different transformation. Machine learning algorithm sometimes can de-
liver better results with appropriate pre-processing techniques. For example, for the
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Table 2 List of hyperparameters optimized in different learners and pre-processors.
Type Name Parameters Default Tuning Range
n estimators 10 [10, 150]
min samples leaf 1 [1, 20]
min samples split 2 [2, 20]
max leaf nodes None [2, 50]
max features auto [0.01, 1]
Random Forest
max depth None [1, 10]
C 1.0 [1.0, 10.0]
max iter 100 [50, 200]Logistic Regression
verbose 0 [0, 10]
alpha 0.0001 [0.0001, 0.001]
learning rate init 0.001 [0.001, 0.01]
power t 0.5 [0.1, 1]
max iter 200 [50, 300]
momentum 0.9 [0.1, 1]
Multilayer Perceptron
n iter no change 10 [1, 100]
leaf size 30 [10, 100]K Nearest Neighbor n neighbors 5 [1, 10]
Learner
Naive Bayes var smoothing 1e-9 [0.0, 1.0]
k 5 [1, 20]
m 50% [50, 400]SMOTE
r 2 [1, 6]
norm l2 [l1, l2, max]Normalizer copy True [True, False]
copy True [True, False]
with mean True [True, False]StandardScaler
with std True [True, False]
copy True [True, False]
min 0 [-5, 0]MinMaxScaler
max 1 [1, 5]
MaxAbsScaler copy True [True, False]
with centering True [True, False]
with scaling True [True, False]
q min 25.0 [10, 40]
q max 75.0 [60, 90]
RobustScaler
copy True [True, False]
n quantiles 1000 [10, 2000]
output distribution uniform [uniform, normal]
ignore implicit zeros False [True, False]
subsample 1e5 [100, 150000]
QuantileTransformer
copy True [True, False]
method yeo-johnson
[yeo-johnson,
box-cox]
standardize True [True, False]PowerTransformer
copy True [True, False]
threshold 0.0 [0, 10]Binarization copy True [True, False]
degree 2 [2, 4]
interaction only False [True, False]
include bias True [True, False]
Pre-processor
PolynomialFeatures
order C [C, F]
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data that is comprised of attributes with varying scales, many machine learning al-
gorithms can benefit from rescaling the attributes so that all attributes have the same
scale. Often this is referred to as normalization and attributes are often rescaled into
the range between 0 and 1. This is useful for optimization algorithms in used in the
core of machine learning algorithms like gradient descent, and is also useful for al-
gorithms that weight inputs like regression and neural networks and algorithms that
use distance measures such as K Nearest Neighbors.
2.5 Machine Learning Algorithms
Once pre-processed, the resulting data must be analyzed by a data miner. In this
work, we use the same five machine learning learners as seen in the FARSEC study,
i.e., Random Forest (RF), Naive Bayes (NB), Logistic Regression (LR), Multilayer
Perceptron (MLP) and K Nearest Neighbor (KNN). They are widely used for soft-
ware engineering classification problems [42]. Table 1 also gives a brief description
of each learning algorithm and Table 2 shows the exact ranges which we explore.
3 Related Work
3.1 Mining Bug Reports
Text mining (also known as Text Analytics) is the process of exploring and analyzing
massive sets of unstructured (e.g., word documents) or semi-structured (e.g., XML
and JSON) text data, in order to identify concepts, patterns, topics and other attributes
in the data. To pre-process the textual content, several steps such as tokenization, fil-
tering, lemmatization, stop-words removal and stemming are usually leveraged [30].
Text mining has recently been widely applied in bug report analysis, such as iden-
tification of duplicated bug reports [17, 29, 41, 56], prediction of the severity or im-
pact of a reported bug [40, 60, 69, 70, 72], extraction of execution commands and
input parameters from performance bug reports [27], assignment of the priority la-
bels to bug reports [61], bug report field reassignment and refinement prediction [68].
In particular, a few studies of bug report classification are more relevant to our
work. Some of those approaches focus on building bug classification models based
on analyzing bug reports with text mining. For example, Zhou et al. [73] leveraged
text mining techniques, analyzed the summary parts of bug reports and fed into ma-
chine learners. Xia et al. [67] developed a framework that applied text mining tech-
nology on bug reports, and trained a model on bug reports with known labels (i.e.,
configuration or non-configuration). The trained model was used to predict the new
bug reports. Popstojanova et al. [22] used different types of textual feature vectors
and focused on applying both supervised and unsupervised algorithms in classify-
ing security and non-security related bug reports. Wijayasekara et al. [66] extracted
textual information by utilizing the textual description of the bug reports. A feature
vector was generated through the textual information, and then presented to a ma-
chine learning classifier.
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Some other approaches use a more heuristic way to identify bug reports. For ex-
ample, Zaman et al. [71] combined keyword searching and statistical sampling to dis-
tinguish between performance bugs and security bugs in Firefox bug reports. Gegick
et al. [20] proposed a technique to identify security bug reports based on keyword
mining, and performed an empirical study based on an industry bug repository.
3.2 FARSEC: Extending Text Mining for Bug Reports
Table 3 Different Filters used in FARSEC.
Filter Description
farsecsq
Apply the Jalali et al. [33] support function
to the frequency of words found in SBRs
farsectwo
Apply the Graham version [23] of multiplying
the frequency by two.
farsec Apply no support function.
clni Apply CLNI filter to non-filtered data.
clnifarsec Apply CLNI filter to farsec filtered data.
clnifarsecsq Apply CLNI filter to farsecsq filtered data.
clnifarsectwo Apply CLNI filter to farsectwo filtered data.
FARSEC [53] is a technique that adds an irrelevancy pruning step to text mining
in building security bug prediction models. Table 3 lists the pruners explored in the
FARSEC research. The purpose of filtering in FARSEC is to remove non-security
bug reports with security related keywords. To achieve this goal, FARSEC applied an
algorithm that firstly calculated the probability of the keyword appearing in security
bug report and non-security bug report, and then calculated the score of the keyword.
Inspired by previous works [23] [33], several tricks were also introduced in FAR-
SEC to reduce false positives. For example, FARSEC built the farsectwo pruner by
multiplying the frequency of non-security bug reports by two, aiming to achieve a
good bias. The farsecsq filter was created by squaring the numerator of the support
function to improve heuristic ranking of low frequency evidence.
In addition, FARSEC also tested a noise detection algorithm called CLNI (Closet
List Noise Identification) [36]. Specifically, CLNI works as follows: During each
iteration, for each instance i, a list of closest instances are calculated and sorted ac-
cording to Euclidean Distance to instance i. The percentage of top N instances with
different class values is recorded. If percentage value is larger or equal to a threshold,
then instance i is highly probable to be a noisy instance and thus included to noise
set S. This process is repeated until two noise sets Si and Si−1 have the similarity
over . A threshold score (e.g., 0.75) is set to remove any non-buggy reports above
the score.
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3.3 Pre-processor Optimization
Class imbalance is a common problem in bug reports, which could lead to poor per-
formance in classifiers. To handle such problem, previous work employed several
strategies, such as Random over-sampling (ROS), random under-sampling (RUS),
SMOTE, and cost-matrix adjuster (CMA) [70]. In addition, some work also proposed
enhanced approaches over SMOTE, such as CR-SMOTE [25] or RSMOTE [24] [14].
The general idea of these is to generate more efficient synthetic instances in the mi-
nority category.
Different from previous techniques, Agrawal et al. [3] improve SMOTE in a more
efficient way from the perspective of pre-processor hyperparameter optimization, and
in their results they summarize as “better data” does better than “better learners”.
In their work, Argawal et al. studied defect classification and usually methods that
work for defect classification might not work for vulnerability classification. This is
because the kinds of data explored by defect classification and vulnerability classifi-
cation are very different. The vulnerability frequencies reported in the Introduction
(1-4% of files) are very common. Yet defect classification usually is performed on
data with much larger target classes. For example, the defect data in a recent defect
classification modeling (DPM) paper used 11 data sets with median number of files
with defects of 34% [39].
Hence we say that prior to this paper, it was an open question if methods (like
those of Agrawal et al.) which are certified for one kind of software engineering
problem (defect classification) work for a very different kind of problem (vulnerabil-
ity classification).
4 SWIFT: the Dual Optimization Approach
As we see from previous discussions, even for each optimization objectives, the tun-
ing work requires evaluations of hundreds to thousands of tuning options. If we op-
timize the learners as well as other pre-processors (list in Table 1) at the same time,
the cost of running a data miner through all those options would be very expensive.
To better address the dual optimization problem, we use a technique called -
dominance. In 2005, Deb et al. [16] proposed partitioning the output space of an
optimizer into -sized grids. In multi-objective optimization (MOO), a solution is
said to dominate the other solution if and only if it is better in at least one objective,
and no worse in other objectives. A set of optimal solutions that are not dominated
by any other feasible solutions form the Pareto frontier. Fig 2 is an example of the
output space based on -dominance. The yellow dots in the figure form the Pareto
frontier.
Deb’s principle of -dominance is that if there exists some  value below which is
useless or impossible to distinguish results, then it is superfluous to explore anything
less than  [16]. Specifically consider the security bug recognition discussed in this
paper, if the performances of two learners (or a learner with various parameters) diff
in less than some , then we cannot statistically distinguish them. For the learners
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Fig. 2 An example of Pareto frontier. Objectives f1 and f2 are both to be minimized.  value is set to 0.1.
The gray dots represent the feasible solutions. The yellow dots represent the Pareto optimal solutions.
do not significantly improve the performance, we can further reduce the attention on
them.
Agrawal et al. [5] successfully applied -dominance to software defect predic-
tion and SE text mining. Their approach, called DODGE, was a tabu search; i.e. if
some setting resulted in some performance within  of any older result, then DODGE
marked that option as “to be avoided”. That algorithm returned the best setting seen
during the following three stage process:
– Initialization: all option items i are assigned equal weightings;
– The item ranking stage reweights items i in column 2 of Table 2; e.g. terms like
“Random Forest” or “RobustScaler”;
– The numeric refinement stage adjusts the tuning ranges of the last column in Ta-
ble 2.
That is to say, item selection handles “big picture” decisions about what pre-processor
or learner to use while numeric refinement focuses on smaller details about numeric
ranges.
More specifically, the algorithm runs as follows:
– Initialization: assign weights wi = 0 to all items i in column 2 of Table 2.
– Item ranking: N1 times, make a random selection of a learner and pre-processor
from column 2, favoring those items with higher weights. For the selected items,
select a value at random from the “Tuning Range”s of the last column of Table 2.
Using that selection, build a model and evaluated it on test data. If we obtain
a model whose performance is is more/less than  of any prior results, then we
add/subtract (respectively) 1.0 from wi.
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– Numeric refinement: N2 times, we refine the numeric tuning ranges (lo, hi) seen
in the last column of Table 2. In this step, the item ranking continues. But now,
if ever some numeric tuning value lo ≤ b ≤ hi produces a better model, then
DODGE adjust that range, as follows. Whichever of x ∈lo,hi that is the furthest
from b is moved to (b+ x)/2.
For the text mining and defect prediction case studies studied by DODGE, that ap-
proach was able to explore a large space of hyperparameter options, while at the same
time generate models that performed as well or better than the prior state of the art in
defect prediction and SE text mining [5].
When we applied DODGE to our security data, it did not work very well. On in-
vestigation, we found that the distribution of the wi weights were highly skewed; i.e.
there was usually only one very good learner and one very good data pre-processor
(we conjecture that this is so since we require very specific biases to find the target
concept of something so particular as a security bug report). But for the original ver-
sion of DODGE, this is a problem since, as mentioned above, item ranking continues
during the numeric refinement stage. This meant, in turn, that DODGE was wasting
much time considering less-than-useful items during numeric refinement.
Accordingly, we introduce an improved approach called SWIFT, which changes
DODGE as follows. After item ranking, only the best learner and data pre-processor
are carried forward into numeric refinement. While that was a small coding change to
the original DODGE, its effects were profound. As shown later in this paper, SWIFT
significantly out-performs other methods studied here.
5 Experiment
5.1 Hyper-parameter Tuning Ranges
This paper compares SWIFT against the differential evolution algorithm (described
above) since recent papers at ICSE [3] the IST journal [4] reported that this optimizer
can find large improvements in learner performance for SE data. See Table 4 for the
control settings for the differential evolution algorithm control parameters used in
this paper (that table was generated by combining the advice at the end of §2.2 with
Table 2). For SWIFT, we used the settings recommended by Agrawal et al. [5].
Note that SWIFT and differential evolution algorithm were applied to learners
from the Python scikit-learn toolkit [51]. Table 2 lists all the hyperparameters we
select for both data mining learners and data pre-processors based on scikit-learn.
We choose not to explore other hyperparameter optimizers, for pragmatic rea-
sons. In our experience, the differential evolution algorithm runs much faster than
many other standard optimizers such as NSGA-II [15]. But as shown below, even
this “fast” optimizer takes a full working day to terminate on the dual optimization
problem for our more complex data sets. When repeated multiple times (within a
cross-validation), we needed 40+ hours of CPU to get a result. Meanwhile, SWIFT
was accomplishing the same tasks in just 2 hours while producing results that dramat-
ically out-performed the prior state-of-the-art. For that reason, we elected to report
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the current results and leave the comparison to other, much more slower, optimizers
for future work.
Table 4 List of parameters in differential evolution algorithm for different learners and pre-processor.
DE ParameterLearner & Pre-processor NP F CR ITER
Random Forest 60
Logistic Regression 30
Multilayer Perceptron 60
K Nearest Neighbor 20
Naive Bayes 10
0.8 0.9 3, 10
SMOTE 30 0.8 0.9 10
5.2 Data
For this work, we compared the differential evolution algorithm (DE) and SWIFT
to FARSEC using the same data as used in the FARSEC study; i.e., one Chromium
project and four Apache projects (i.e., Wicket, Ambari, Camel and Derby). According
to FARSEC, these bug reports from the Apache projects were randomly selected with
a BUG or IMPROVEMENT label, and then manually labeled via human inspection.
For the Chromium project, security bugs are labeled as Bug-Security when submitted
to bug tracking systems. All other types of bug reports are treated as non-security bug
reports.
Table 5 shows the FARSEC datasets. As mentioned in the introduction, one unique
feature of that data is the rariety of the target class. As shown in the “Percent Buggy”
column, security reports make up a very small percentage of the total number of bug
reports in projects like Chromium.
5.3 Experimental Rig
The results of this paper come from a 10-way cross-validation. After dividing each
training data intoB = 10 bins, we tested our models using binBi after training them
on data −Bi. The 10-way cross-validation is used to pick the best candidate learner
with the highest performance for that data set in tuning learners or pre-processors.
Note that selecting the best candidate learner in SWIFT is based on weight calculation
as we discuss in Section 4. We then train the candidate learner with the whole training
data set, and test on the separate testing data set as FARSEC.
This 10-way process was applied to five projects (described in the next section);
the five learners listed above; and the following eight data pruning operators:
– train; i.e. no data pruning;
– The seven variations of farsec and clni listed in Table 3.
That is, we ran our learners 2000 times:
5 projects ∗ 8 pruners ∗ 5 learners ∗ 10 ways
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Table 5 Imbalanced characteristics of bug report data sets from FARSEC [53]
.
#Security #Bug Percent
Project Filter Bugs reports buggy
Chromium
train
77
20970 0.4
farsecsq 14219 0.5
farsectwo 20968 0.4
farsec 20969 0.4
clni 20154 0.4
clnifarsecsq 13705 0.6
clnifarsectwo 20152 0.4
clnifarsec 20153 0.4
Wicket
train
4
500 0.8
farsecsq 136 2.9
farsectwo 143 2.8
farsec 302 1.3
clni 392 1.0
clnifarsecsq 46 8.7
clnifarsectwo 49 8.2
clnifarsec 196 2.0
Ambari
train
22
500 4.4
farsecsq 149 14.8
farsectwo 260 8.5
farsec 462 4.8
clni 409 5.4
clnifarsecsq 76 28.9
clnifarsectwo 181 12.2
clnifarsec 376 5.9
Camel
train
14
500 2.8
farsecsq 116 12.1
farsectwo 203 6.9
farsec 470 3.0
clni 440 3.2
clnifarsecsq 71 19.7
clnifarsectwo 151 9.3
clnifarsec 410 3.4
Derby
train
46
500 9.2
farsecsq 57 80.7
farsectwo 185 24.9
farsec 489 9.4
clni 446 10.3
clnifarsecsq 48 95.8
clnifarsectwo 168 27.4
clnifarsec 435 10.6
5.4 Evaluation Metrics
To understand the open issues with vulnerability classification, firstly we must define
how they are assessed. If (TN, FN, FP, TP) are the true negatives, false negatives,
false positives, and true positives, respectively, found by a detector, then:
– pd = Recall = TP/(TP+FN), the percentage of the actual vulnerabilities that are
predicted to be vulnerabilities;
– pf = False Alarms = FP/(FP+TN), the percentage of the non-vulnerable artifacts
that are reported as vulnerable;
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– prec = Precision = TP/(TP+FP), the percentage of the predicted vulnerabilities
that are actual vulnerabilities;
This paper adopts the same evaluation criteria of the original FARSEC paper;
i.e. the recall (pd) and false alarm (pf) measures. Also, to control the optimization
of differential evolution algorithm, we instructed it to minimize false alarms while
maximizing recall. To achieve those goals, in differential evolution algorithm, we
maximize the g-measure which is the harmonic mean of recall and the compliment
of false alarms.
g =
2× pd × (1− pf )
pd + (1− pf ) (1)
g is maximal when both recall (pd) is high and false alarm (pf) is low. In the case of
classifying unbalanced data, g-measure is more suitable for evaluation purpose than
other metrics such as precision.
Note that recall evaluates a classifiers performance with respect to false negatives,
while precision evaluates its performance with respect to false positives. For imbal-
anced dataset such as bug reports where security bugs are in a very small portion, we
want to focus more on minimising False Negatives. Therefore, g-measure is a better
choice.
Besides, we also adopt another evaluation measure called IFA (Initial False Alarm)
to evaluate the performance. IFA is the number of initial false alarm encountered be-
fore we make the first correct prediction [31] [32]. IFA is widely used in defect pre-
diction, and previous works [38] [50] have shown that developers are not willing to
use a prediction model if the first few recommendations are all false alarms.
5.5 Statistics
This study ranks treatments using the Scott-Knott procedure recommended by Mit-
tas & Angelis in their 2013 IEEE TSE paper [48]. This method sorts results from
different treatments, then splits them in order to maximize the expected value of dif-
ferences in the observed performances before and after divisions. For lists l,m, n
of size ls,ms,ns where l = m ∪ n, the “best” division maximizes E(∆); i.e. the
difference in the expected mean value before and after the spit:
E(∆) =
ms
ls
abs(m.µ− l.µ)2 + ns
ls
abs(n.µ− l.µ)2
Scott-Knott then checks if that “best” division is actually useful. To implement that
check, Scott-Knott would apply some statistical hypothesis test H to check if m,n
are significantly different (and if so, Scott-Knott then recurses on each half of the
“best” division). For this study, our hypothesis test H was a conjunction of the A12
effect size test of and non-parametric bootstrap sampling; i.e. our Scott-Knott divided
the data if both bootstrapping and an effect size test agreed that the division was
statistically significant (95% confidence) and not a “small” effect (A12 ≥ 0.6).
For a justification of the use of non-parametric bootstrapping, see Efron & Tib-
shirani [18, p220-223]. For a justification of the use of effect size tests see Kamp-
enes [34] who warn that even if a hypothesis test declares two populations to be “sig-
nificantly” different, then that result is misleading if the “effect size” is very small.
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Hence, to assess the performance differences we first must rule out small effects.
Vargha and Delaney’s non-parametric A12 effect size test explores two lists M and
N of size m and n:
A12 =
 ∑
x∈M,y∈N
{
1 if x > y
0.5 if x == y
 /(mn)
This expression computes the probability that numbers in one sample are bigger
than in another. This test was endorsed by Arcuri and Briand [6]. Table 6, Table 7
present the reports of our Scott-Knott procedure for each project data set. These re-
sults are discussed, extensively, over the next two pages.
6 Results
We now answer our proposed research questions:
6.1 RQ1
RQ1. Can hyperparameter optimization technique distinguish which bug are ac-
tually security problems?
Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 report results with and without hyperparameter op-
timization of the pre-processor or learners or both. In the table, in each row, the
gray highlights show all results ranked “best” by a statistical Scott-Knot test.
6.1.1 Recall Results
In the recall results of Table 6 , FARSEC very rarely achieved best results while
SWIFT achieved results that were dramatically better than FARSEC. For example:
– In Chromium, mean recall changed from 20.4% to 77.1% from FARSEC to SWIFT
– In Ambri, mean recall changed from 30.4 to 83.9% from FARSEC to SWIFT.
While SWIFT’s recall reults inn Chromium are good, the gray cells show us that other
methods did even better. In Table 5, we saw that this data had the smallest target class
(often less than half a percent). For this data set, it seems more important to fix the
class imbalance (with SMOTE) than to adjust the learners (with SWIFT). But even
here SWIFT performed much better than FARSEC. Also, in 6 of 8 cases, SWIFT’s
Chromium recalls were either best or within 5% of the best.
Just for completeness, we note that for all methods that did any data preprocessing
(SMOTE, SMOTUNED, SWIFT) performed very well for Wicket. Clearly, for this
data set, repairing the class imbalance issue is essential.
Improved Recognition of Security Bugs via Dual Hyperparameter Optimization 19
Table 6 RQ1 results: recall. In these results, higher recalls (a.k.a. pd) are better. For each row, best results
are highlighted in gray (these are the cells that are statistically the same as the best median result– as
judged by our Scott-Knot test). Across all rows, SWIFT has the most number of best results.
Prior state
of the art
[53]
Tuning
learner
(only)
Imbalance
class repair
(no tuning)
Imbalance
class repair
(tuned via DE)
Tune
everything
(dual)
Project Filter FARSEC DE+Learner SMOTE SMOTUNED SWIFT
train 15.7 46.9 68.7 73.9 86.1
farsecsq 14.8 64.3 80.0 84.3 72.2
farsectwo 15.7 40.9 78.3 77.4 77.4
farsec 15.7 46.1 80.8 72.2 77.4
clni 15.7 30.4 74.8 72.2 80.9
clnifarsecsq 49.6 72.2 82.6 86.1 72.2
clnifarsectwo 15.7 50.4 79.1 74.8 78.3
Chromium
clnifarsec 15.7 47.8 78.3 74.7 72.2
train 16.7 0.0 66.7 66.7 50.0
farsecsq 66.7 50.0 83.3 83.3 83.3
farsectwo 66.7 50.0 66.7 66.7 66.7
farsec 33.3 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7
clni 0.0 16.7 50.0 50.0 50.0
clnifarsecsq 33.3 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.3
clnifarsectwo 33.3 50.0 66.7 66.7 66.7
Wicket
clnifarsec 50.0 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7
train 14.3 28.6 57.1 57.1 85.7
farsecsq 42.9 57.1 57.1 57.1 85.7
farsectwo 57.1 57.1 57.1 57.1 85.7
farsec 14.3 57.1 57.1 57.1 85.7
clni 14.3 28.6 57.1 57.1 85.7
clnifarsecsq 57.1 57.1 57.1 57.1 71.4
clnifarsectwo 28.6 57.1 57.1 57.1 85.7
Ambari
clnifarsec 14.3 57.1 57.1 57.1 85.7
train 11.1 16.7 33.3 44.4 55.6
farsecsq 16.7 44.4 44.4 55.6 66.7
farsectwo 50.0 44.4 61.1 61.1 61.1
farsec 16.7 22.2 33.3 33.3 55.6
clni 16.7 16.7 33.3 38.9 50.0
clnifarsecsq 16.7 38.9 27.8 33.3 61.1
clnifarsectwo 11.1 61.1 72.2 61.1 61.1
Camel
clnifarsec 16.7 22.2 33.3 38.9 55.6
train 38.1 47.6 54.7 59.5 69.0
farsecsq 54.8 59.5 54.7 66.7 66.7
farsectwo 47.6 59.5 47.6 66.7 78.6
farsec 38.1 47.6 57.1 59.5 64.3
clni 23.8 45.2 57.7 61.9 69.0
clnifarsecsq 54.8 59.5 76.2 69.0 66.7
clnifarsectwo 35.7 59.5 54.8 61.9 66.7
Derby
clnifarsec 38.1 47.6 61.9 57.1 66.7
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Table 7 RQ1 results: false positive rate, the lower values are better. Same as Table 6; i.e. best results are
shown in grey. While FARSEC has the the most best results, these low false alarms are only achieved by
settling for very low recalls (see Table 6).
Prior state
of the art
[53]
Tuning
learner
(only)
Imbalance
class repair
(no tuning)
Imbalance
class repair
(tuned via DE)
Tune
everything
(dual)
Project Filter FARSEC DE+Learner SMOTE SMOTUNED SWIFT
train 0.2 6.8 24.1 17.8 24.0
farsecsq 0.3 10.3 31.5 25.1 14.3
farsectwo 0.2 6.5 27.6 23.1 26.1
farsec 0.2 6.9 36.1 14.9 14.7
clni 0.2 4.1 24.8 13.6 26.2
clnifarsecsq 3.8 14.2 30.4 25.6 14.0
clnifarsectwo 0.2 7.0 29.9 12.8 18.9
Chromium
clnifarsec 0.2 10.4 29.0 17.1 20.2
train 7.1 5.1 32.0 12.1 27.5
farsecsq 38.3 44.5 71.3 66.8 66.7
farsectwo 36.6 42.3 68.2 62.9 61.5
farsec 8.1 23.1 43.9 26.1 23.3
clni 5.5 2.4 21.1 12.5 14.4
clnifarsecsq 25.5 66.8 66.8 66.8 57.5
clnifarsectwo 27.7 39.9 61.3 61.3 52.8
Wicket
clnifarsec 10.5 23.1 38.9 22.9 22.1
train 1.6 0.8 20.1 10.8 17.8
farsecsq 14.4 2.8 30.4 17.2 23.7
farsectwo 3.0 2.8 22.1 17.8 19.7
farsec 4.9 2.0 19.9 7.1 20.3
clni 2.6 0.8 12.4 8.9 18.1
clnifarsecsq 7.7 2.4 13.4 7.1 29.0
clnifarsectwo 4.5 2.8 13.0 5.1 22.7
Ambari
clnifarsec 0.0 2.4 7.9 3.9 18.9
train 3.5 1.5 27.4 35.9 15.8
farsecsq 11.4 24.7 20.5 23.4 27.8
farsectwo 41.8 17.6 71.0 53.1 45.2
farsec 6.9 12.4 39.4 28.0 35.7
clni 12.3 7.9 33.6 35.3 24.7
clnifarsecsq 13.9 14.9 12.4 15.6 27.2
clnifarsectwo 7.7 50.0 64.9 51.9 38.8
Camel
clnifarsec 5.0 11.6 24.9 34.4 37.1
train 6.8 39.3 22.2 20.7 19.7
farsecsq 29.9 40.6 51.7 51.5 22.5
farsectwo 12.4 24.2 27.9 33.6 40.0
farsec 6.3 4.1 21.0 19.0 13.8
clni 0.4 3.5 16.8 24.5 25.5
clnifarsecsq 29.9 42.4 74.7 65.1 42.3
clnifarsectwo 9.2 24.2 36.5 30.3 52.2
Derby
clnifarsec 6.8 3.9 28.8 10.9 19.6
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6.1.2 False Alarm Results
As to the false alarm results, Table 7 shows that FARSEC has the lowest false alarm.
However, it is clear that these low false alarms are only achieved by settling for very
low recalls (as seen in Table 6). SWIFT’s false alarm rare are highest but with one ex-
ception, not dramatically so. For example, in Chromium, SWIFT’s mean false alarm
rate is less than 20%.
The one exception is that SWIFT had high false alarm rates in Wicket– but then so
did every other method that achieved recalls over 50%. From Table 5, we know that
Wicket only has too few known security bugs. For such an extremely rarefied data
set, we would argue that high false alarm rates are the inevitable result of achieving
medium to high recalls.
6.1.3 Initial False Alarms
IFA is the number of false alarms a programmer must suffer through before they find
a real security bug. Table 8 show our IFA results. There are three things to note from
that table:
– FARSEC has no results in this table because FARSEC was implemented in Weka
which does not report IFA.
– For IFA, methods that only with/tune the data pre-processor (SMOTE and SMO-
TUNED) perform worse than methods that tune the learner (DE+Learner and
SWIFT).
– In terms of absolute numbers, the IFA results are very low for Ambrai and Derby.
From Table 5, we can conjecture some reason for this– of the data sets with more
than 1% (on average) security bugs, these data sets have the most known security
bugs.
– At the other end of the spectrum, IFA is much larger for Chromium (mean values
for DE+learner or SWIFT of 50 or 60). This result highlights the high cost of
building highly secure software. When the target class is rare, even with our best-
of-breed methods, some non-trivial amount of manual effort may be required.
6.1.4 RQ1, Summary
In summary, for RQ1 we can answer, hyperparameter optimization technique help
better distinguish security bug reports from non-security bugs reports, i.e., improving
bug reports classification performance. Further, the best results for recall/pd come at
the cost of a relatively minor increase in the false alarm rate.
6.2 RQ2
RQ2. Is it better to dual optimize the learners or the data pre-processors in security
bug report classification?
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Table 8 RQ1 results: initial false alarm (IFA). IFA is the number of false alarms developers must suffer
through before finding their first error. Lower values are better. Same as format as Table 6; i.e. best results
are shown in grey.
Prior state
of the art
[53]
Tuning
learner
(only)
Imbalance
class repair
(no tuning)
Imbalance
class repair
(tuned via DE)
Tune
everything
(dual)
Project Filter FARSEC DE+Learner SMOTE SMOTUNED SWIFT
train N/A 62 75 61 58
farsecsq N/A 20 72 54 36
farsectwo N/A 37 91 78 87
farsec N/A 62 112 62 56
clni N/A 41 86 48 74
clnifarsecsq N/A 41 57 62 37
clnifarsectwo N/A 37 89 47 58
Chromium
clnifarsec N/A 62 113 63 54
train N/A 25 60 34 46
farsecsq N/A 29 37 33 39
farsectwo N/A 32 35 34 31
farsec N/A 23 44 30 22
clni N/A 12 44 21 27
clnifarsecsq N/A 9 8 9 6
clnifarsectwo N/A 8 11 12 8
Wicket
clnifarsec N/A 17 33 15 18
train N/A 7 8 9 4
farsecsq N/A 8 21 14 7
farsectwo N/A 1 19 12 3
farsec N/A 1 35 24 17
clni N/A 1 32 19 13
clnifarsecsq N/A 8 18 10 8
clnifarsectwo N/A 7 28 8 11
Ambari
clnifarsec N/A 5 10 4 17
train N/A 6 19 23 15
farsecsq N/A 23 29 32 14
farsectwo N/A 4 13 8 25
farsec N/A 17 21 20 8
clni N/A 16 37 33 30
clnifarsecsq N/A 5 3 3 4
clnifarsectwo N/A 19 22 15 12
Camel
clnifarsec N/A 14 23 29 22
train N/A 4 6 3 2
farsecsq N/A 4 4 4 4
farsectwo N/A 4 3 5 3
farsec N/A 1 8 7 4
clni N/A 1 8 5 3
clnifarsecsq N/A 1 2 2 1
clnifarsectwo N/A 2 9 8 4
Derby
clnifarsec N/A 1 3 3 2
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Table 9 How often is each treatment seen to be best in Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8.
Metric Rank Method Win Times
1 SWIFT 31/40
2 SMOTE 14/40
3 SMOTUNED 13/40Recall
4 DE+Learner 3/40
1 DE+Learner 14/40
2 SMOTE 1/40
3 SWIFT 1/40
False
Alarm
5 SMOTUNED 0/40
1 DE+Learner 22/40
2 SWIFT 18/40
3 SMOTUNED 4/40IFA
4 SMOTE 3/40
This question explores the merits of dual optimization of learner plus pre-processor
versus just optimizing one or the other. To answer that question, we count how often
each method achieved top-rank (and had gray-colored results) across all three metrics
of the rows on Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8.
Those counts are shown in Table 9. From that table, we can say, in terms of recall:
– SWIFT’s dual optimization is clearly best.
– Tuning just the data pre-processing (with SMOTE or SMOTUNED) comes a dis-
tant second;
– And tuning just the learners (with DE+Learner) is even worse.
Hence we say that, when distinguishing security bugs, it is not enough to just tune
the learners.
In terms of false alarms, we see that:
– Tuning just the learner is a comparatively better method than anything else.
– Tuning anything else does not do well on the false alarm scale.
That said, tuning just the learner achieves a score of 14/40– which is not even half the
results. Hence, based on false alarm rates, we cannot comment on what works best
for improving false alarms.
In terms of IFA (initial false alarms), we see that:
– Methods that do not tune a learner (SMOTE and SMOTUNED) perform very
badly.
– As to the other methods, there is is no clear winner for best method. DE+Learner
or SWIFT perform nearly the same as each other.
6.3 RQ2: Summary
Based on the above, we say that:
– We have unequivocal results that dual tuning works very well for recall.
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Table 10 Average runtime (in minutes) of tuning all learners’ hyperparameters, SMOTE’s hyperparame-
ters and running SWIFT.
Project DE3 DE10 SMOTUNED SWIFT
Chromium 455 876 20 12
Wicket 8 11 8 5
Ambari 8 11 8 5
Camel 8 11 8 5
Derby 8 11 8 5
– Also, not tuning the learner performs very badly for IFA.
– There is no clear pattern in Table 9 regarding false alarm rates.
That said, the absolutely numbers for false alarm see in Table 7 are somewhat lower
than the false alarm rates seen in other analytics papers [45]. Hence, on a more posi-
tive note, we can still recommend dual optimization since:
– It has much benefit (dramatically higher recalls);
– With no excessive cost (no large increase in false alarms; IFA rates nearly as good
as anything else).
Further to this comment of “no excessive cost”, Table 10 shows the average runtime
for each treatment. From the table, differential evolution algorithm on learners con-
sume much more CPU time than others, while dual optimization as SWIFT shows
slight advantages even better than SMOTUNED.
6.4 RQ3
RQ3. What are the relative merits of irrelevancy pruning (e.g., filtering) vs hyper-
parameter optimization in security bug report classification?
In this question, we explore the core assumptions of the FARSEC study and this
study:
– FARSEC assumed that it was best to remove non-security bug reports by checking
for any security related keywords.
– We assume that it is best to perform hyperparamter optimziation on both the data
miner and data pre-processing.
Our results show that with hyperparameter optimization, there is no added benefit
to FARCECs irrelevancy pruning. For example, for each project, the train pd results
in the FARSEC column of Table 6 are usually smaller than the other values seen
after applying some of the filters proposed by Peters et al. This result confirms that,
without hyperparameter optimization, irrelevancy pruning does indeed improve the
performance of vulnerability classification.
Hence, while we recommend hyperparameter optimization, if data analysts wish
to avoid that added complexity, they could apply FARSECs irrelevancy pruning.
Improved Recognition of Security Bugs via Dual Hyperparameter Optimization 25
7 Threats to Validity
As to any empirical study, biases can affect the final results. Therefore, conclusions
drawn from this work must be considered with threats to validity in mind.
Sampling Bias. Sampling bias threatens any classification experiments. For ex-
ample, the data sets used here come from FARSEC, i.e., one Chromium project and
four Apache projects in different application domains. In addition, the bug reports
from Apache projects are randomly selected with a BUG or IMPROVEMENT label
for each project. On way to justify these decisions is to say that they are exactly the
same decisions as those adopted by Peters et al. in their TSE paper.
Learner Bias. Research into automatic classifiers is a large and active field.
While different machine learning algorithms have been developed to solve differ-
ent classification problem tasks. Any data mining study, such as this paper, can only
use a small subset of the known classification algorithms. For this week, we selected
our learners such that we can compare our results to prior work. According, we used
the same learners as Peters et al. in their FARSEC research.
Input Bias. Our results come from the space of hyperparameter tunings explored
in this paper. In theory, other ranges might lead to other results. That said, our goal
here is not to offer the best tuning but to argue that dual tuning of data pre-processors
and algorithms is preferable to tuning either, just by itself. For those purposes, we
would argue that our current results suffice.
8 Conclusion
Distinguishing security bugs from other kinds of bugs is a pressing problem that
threatens not only the viability of software services, but also consumer confidence
in those services. Prior results on how to distinquish such bugs have had issues with
the scarcity of vulnerability data (specifically, such incidents occur very rarely). In a
recent TSE’18 paper, Peters et al. proposed some novel filtering algorithms to help
improve security bug report classification. Results from FARSEC show that such
filtering techniques can improve bug report classification.
But more than that, our experiments show that we can do better than FARSEC
using hyperparameter optimization of learners and data pre-processors. Of those two
approaches, our results show that it is more advantageous to apply dual optimiza-
tion of both the data-processor and the learner, which we will recommend in solving
similar problems in the future work.
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